Nullify or apply weight a bias on voting Kusama governance for exchanges and centralized custodian pools

Presently, exchanges and other centralized custodian type pools represent a very large and very centralized population of KSM. Should they so choose, the operators of these KSM aggregates could begin to vote and shape Kusama towards their benefit. In the case of Binance and several others, they own and operate products competing for market share.They would have an unfair advantage in voting on Kusama governance.

I would like to propose the following criteria that (if met) would affect the voting power of these groups.

1. Validator commission is higher than 20%, validator stake KSM cannot be used for governance
2. KSM Staked and nominating validator(s)that meet the criteria of #1 above are reduced by the ratio of bad validators to good validators (e.g., nominate 1 validator with 100% commission and another with 3% = 1 of 2) so these staked KSM voting power would be 50%
3. Alternative to 2, Voting power is 100% when a good validator is nominated in the active set. Zero % when nominating a validator that meets criteria #1.