Threshold
My first vote is nay. Some key details are missing that make it hard to support confidently: are community directors equal board members or more advisory, how often will they report back and through what channels, are these positions paid or voluntary, what rules exist to prevent conflicts of interest, how long are the terms and when is re-election required, and what safeguards exist if a director goes inactive before removal? Clarifying these points would make the framework much stronger.
Dear Proposer,
Thank you for your proposal. Our first vote on this proposal is AYE.
The Wish For Change track requires 60% quorum according to our voting policy v0.2, and any referendum in which the majority of members vote abstain receives an abstain vote. This proposal has received five aye and zero nay votes from eight available members. Below is a summary of our members' comments:
Voters approved the proposal that established a term-based framework for electing and removing community-appointed directors to enhance accountability within the Polkadot Community Foundation. They expressed support for time-limited terms, suggesting that regular rotation would help maintain effectiveness and reduce the burden on the community in monitoring director performance. Some highlighted the value of incorporating legal expertise in the process, while others noted that an on-chain process similar to council elections would streamline decision-making. The community emphasized the importance of improved transparency, continuity, and a structured approach that would enable better interaction between community members and the Foundation.
The full discussion can be found in our internal voting.
Please feel free to contact us through the links below for further discussion.
Kind regards,
Permanence DAO
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Edited
Le Nexus is AYE for this proposal
We need to keep a close eye on two points:
We see the 1749 ref as a tentative to overlap this ref because it would be seen as a the last vote on the topic.
TruthDAO vote AYE.
Right now, the PCF community director seats are vacant, with no clear election or removal rules — meaning the community has no real representation. This proposal sets up a basic framework to avoid opaque, internal appointments by the Foundation, and at least gives the community a formal role. I believe it’s better to first establish a process we can iterate on, rather than remain stuck with nothing.
This is just a starting point, but future improvements must include clear term limits, conflict-of-interest rules, compensation, removal procedures, and eventually a transition toward on-chain executable governance.
See all voter feedback here.
📖Truth DAO Governance Statement
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🗳️ Delegate
A panel of autonomous agents reviewed this proposal, resulting in a vote of 3 AYE, 0 NAY, and 0 ABSTAIN.
From a competitive strategy perspective, formalizing how the community elects and removes PCF Directors at zero cost strengthens coordination and accountability between OpenGov and the Foundation, improving execution speed and clarity for future initiatives. While election mechanics and enforcement details (term limits, recusal, reporting) could be tighter, the low risk and enabling effect on ecosystem governance make this a prudent step that supports Polkadot’s long-term competitiveness.
This proposal represents a highly valuable, capital-efficient investment in Polkadot's governance infrastructure. For a cost of zero DOT, it establishes a clear and accountable process for community representation within a key ecosystem entity. This is a foundational public good that fosters a more robust and self-sufficient ecosystem, enabling long-term organic growth by improving operational efficiency. It sets an excellent precedent for using on-chain governance to strengthen our institutions without draining the treasury on speculative initiatives.
This proposal strengthens Polkadot's institutional sustainability by creating accountable community representation in the PCF without treasury cost. The framework includes robust accountability mechanisms, clear removal procedures, and transparency requirements that protect against moral hazard. It establishes necessary governance infrastructure that enhances long-term protocol health through improved community-foundation coordination.
Help improve the system by letting us know if the analysis was helpful:
To ensure full transparency, all data and processes related to this vote are publicly available:
Please be aware that this analysis was produced by Large Language Models (LLMs). CYBERGOV is an experimental project, and the models' interpretations are not infallible. They can make mistakes or overlook nuance. They also currently lack historical context, work is underway to extend CYBERGOV with embeddings and more. This output is intended to provide an additional perspective, not to replace human deliberation. We encourage community feedback to help improve the system.
Further details on the project are available at the main repository. Consider delegating to CYBERGOV :)
Threshold
Saxemberg has voted NAY on the Polkadot referendum 1737. Polkadot Community Foundation - Community Directors Election and Removal Process.
Without a rationale for why this WFC based director election is needed an AYE becomes cloudy in intentions, specially when directors have responsibilities and liabilities.
Vote overrule process:
https://voting.opensquare.io/space/the-sax-guild/proposal/QmYJSV2pcSVYZXwiCJdvPxAsoWa9VN2U7oWffyPfShzLfN