Project Glove: Introducing Capital Efficiency and Pseudo-Anonymity on top of OpenGov

MAJOR UPDATE: GLOVE WILL FIRST DEPLOY ON KUSAMA IF APPROVED.

If Referenda 450 passes, we will first deploy Project Glove on Kusama.

We understand that it would be easy to be skeptical of this promise, especially if you don't know us personally, but it is not in the delivery team's strategic interest to not fullfil this commitment for several reasons:

1. We are doxxed.
2. The company behind the delivery team is a Delaware C-Corp that is currently in good standing.
3. Our team's amibitions are predicated on developing constructive, long-term business relationships within the Polkadot community.
4. We want to eventually become a direct blockspace customer.

Please consider this in connection with any modifications in voting decisions!

Project Glove: An Open Source Protocol Enabling Capital Efficiency and Pseudo-Anonymity on top of OpenGov

Project Glove Context 

Polkadot’s OpenGov governance system offers tremendous opportunity for experimentation, network engagement and value creation.

As is so often the case in the blockchain space, the Polkadot Network is at the forefront of 

innovation and its governance system is no different.

OpenGov, despite its potential to generate enormous demand for Polkadot, has very limited participation. 

Two reasons for this include:

1. Many DOT holders value near-term liquidity for their DOT.

2. Many DOT holders fear of being “doxxed” from their public voting behavior.

Project Glove seeks to address both of these OpenGov pain points by introducing an opt-in, open-source protocol enabling capital efficiency and pseudo-anonymity on top of OpenGov in order to meaningfully increase OpenGov participation, Polkadot network transactions, and voting power decentralization.

OpenGov Challenges Overview

The capital efficiency challenge in OpenGov is a well understood dynamic. This dynamic is a product of the OpenGov design which requires DOT to be locked up at increasing multipliers to boost voting power in exchange for the inability to transfer that DOT to another wallet. Many DOT holders value short-term liquidity, so aren’t willing to engage in voting with a meaningful portion of their DOT, or with a higher multiplier. The net result is that liquidity-focused DOT holders don’t vote.

The second challenge – a fear of being doxed – is not often discussed, but is a natural product of human psychology in such a competitive, high-stakes paradigm. OpenGov participation can, therefore, carry high emotional, social, and even financial consequences for direct participants. Given the Polkadot Network publicly broadcasts all transactions, many DOT holders are afraid that their governance activities will be mapped back to their real world identities, resulting in:

• Harassment, bullying, and threats against safety.

• Exclusion from social groups and communities.

• Loss of future financial opportunities, including damage to personal brands.
  

Fortunately, not all OpenGov participants have experienced these harmful situations, but many are afraid that they will, and avoid governance participation altogether.

In fact, this fear is so extreme that many DOT holders move their DOT to centralized exchanges to avoid the possibility of being doxxed.

And while public accountability is important for those proposing referenda, it shouldn’t necessarily be a requirement for everyone interested in expressing opinions on proposals.

Project Glove addresses both of these pain points as part of its open source deliverables.

Project Glove Snapshot 

Project Glove introduces a layer of capital efficiency and pseudo-anonymity in the OpenGov voting process to generate more OpenGov participation. Kindly note that Project Glove is not proposing any changes to the core Polkadot Network, but rather, delivers a protocol on top of the existing OpenGov system.

To share the clear value proposition of Project Glove, let’s imagine an OpenGov scenario without Project Glove with three voters on a hypothetical referenda:

Three voters have expressed their opinion with the majority of their DOT using lock-up periods ranging from 28 to 112 days, with the net result of the three votes being a 300 DOT advantage to Aye (450 + 250 - 400).

But perhaps, based on the aggregated results of a referendum, the same on-chain outcome could take place, without each voter needing to use that much DOT, at that high of a multiplier.

For the network to officially decide on a referendum, the existing OpenGov system is not opinionated on what conviction multipliers are used by DOT voters, but rather, the sum of aggregated voting power between aye and nay votes.

See the same scenario through Project Glove, where Project Glove significantly improves the capital efficiency for all three voters based on the aggregate result of their netted intended voting behavior, with a voting result of a 300 DOT advantage to Aye:

In this Project Glove scenario, the protocol enables all three participating DOT Holders to use less DOT at lower convictions to achieve the same net OpenGov result, despite all three participating DOT holders being willing to vote with more DOT at higher convictions.

In addition to capital efficiency, Project Glove can also be optimized for public misdirection, enabling voters to ensure that the on-chain result of their vote differs from their true feelings.

See an alternative Project Glove scenario OpenGov result (net 300 DOT aye) below: 

In this Project Glove scenario, the outcome (aye/nay/abstain) as well as the amount of DOT used and the corresponding conviction, differs from what the voter would have otherwise been prepared to utilize.

For the avoidance of doubt, Project Glove can’t always obscure that a DOT holder has participated in governance, but it can obscure how a DOT holder has participated in governance, assuming there is a sufficient amount of varying views on a particular referendum.

While further investigation is required to optimize Project Glove by taking into account the impact on referenda quorums, user preferences between capital efficiency and misdirection on a per-referenda basis, referenda duration, and overall system efficiency, the Project Glove framework will generate significantly more OpenGov participation from DOT holders that are sensitive to liquidity and anonymity.

Please visit this link for more project detail.

FAQ

How do DOT holders benefit from this?

This proposal benefits DOT holders and the Polkadot Network in the following ways:

• More Governance Participation: Increased quality of governance outcomes, due to more inclusive participation.
• More DOT Transactions: Through more governance participation.
• More Decentralized Voting Power Pockets: As a result of currently idle actors with larger DOT positions becoming engaged.
• Elevate OpenGov: Resulting from a new primitive built on top that any ecosystem actor can use, that promotes innovation and new mechanisms for increasing network engagement.

Under what license will the deliverables be deployed?

All deliverables will be deployed under a AGPL license. 

Why should DOT holders trust Project Glove? 

We are designing an opt-in system that introduces the possibility of anonymity and capital efficiency in voting. We don’t believe that the core Polkadot Network should introduce these features, and they are better implemented as an opt-in system, much like the utilization of parachains. DOT holders are free to participate or leave Project Glove as they please. Project Glove doesn’t custody any DOT. All ecosystem members will be able to verify the source code of the Enclave, and set up their own instances once delivered.

Why does this project need to exist, and why should it be funded by the Treasury?

OpenGov has extremely low participation, and Project Glove represents a tangible way to boost participation based on identified pain points and DOT holder validation. We are also incredibly excited about Project Glove because it introduces experimentation on top of the amazing OpenGov system, without attempting to make any changes to the core Polkadot Network. The deliverables are open source and can be repurposed in many ways, including for other active voters and voter groups.

What is the project’s path to sustainability?

The deliverables, on a standalone basis, are a means to increasing OpenGov participation and pockets of power across the ecosystem. Project Glove deliverables will be open for everyone to run. Increased OpenGov participation will correlate to more business opportunities for Address Labs.