Origin for signaling that the network wishes for some change

wish_for_change

Rejected

Inclusion of DED in marketing narratives

- A parachain (not named) asked for visibility from a marketing bounty.
- The best way to receive this visibility is through a community referendum.
- The referendum would decide if the parachain should be included in the marketing bounty.
- This method is considered the most democratic.
- Moonbeam, a significant parachain, is initiating this process.
- Other parachains should also submit their own referendum requests.
- The goal is to ensure fair and community-driven decisions.

Executed

WHO: Parachains interested in receiving visibility from marketing bounty.

WHAT: Submit a referendum on the track requesting inclusion.

PRICE/TIMEFRAME/RESOURCES: Not specified.

Inclusion of Moonbeam in marketing narratives

DED is a popular meme coin on the Polkadot network. It is the most successful meme coin on Polkadot, with high trading volumes and listings on central exchanges. DED has distributed coins to all DOT holders, unlike other meme coins. The success of DED and Polkadot helps each other, and it is important for both to support each other. Making DED the official meme coin of Polkadot will be good for both projects.

Make DED the official meme coin of Polkadot DED is by far the most successful meme coin on Polkadot, the only one being listed on a CEX (and soon more of them) with volumes above $500k per day DED is also the only one that really distributed DED to every single DOT holder unlike the other failed meme coins that didn't even bother to distribute to DOT holders DOT and DED have a synergetic relationship, the success of one increases the success of the other It's important that they always support each other, so that they each other can put the other one in a better light It's important for Polkadot ecosystem to show that we have a successful meme coin and it's also important for DED to get official support from Polkadot so that it can thrive This is going to be a win-win for both projects

WHO: Proposal for Polkadot ecosystem

WHAT: Make DED the official meme coin of Polkadot

PRICE/TIMEFRAME/RESOURCES: Not specified.

Make DED the official meme coin of Polkadot

In 2023, Laurent Koehler, Co-Director of the Founder Institute in Hong Kong, planned to launch a Web3 vertical in 2024 to help investors and applicants. He worked with a Web3 Advisor to explore opportunities for the Polkadot ecosystem. On March 15, 2024, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to onboard mentors and develop co-marketing initiatives.

The Founder Institute is the world's largest pre-seed startup accelerator, founded in 2009. It helps early-stage startups succeed and has expanded globally, operating in over 200 cities. Alumni have raised over $1.75 billion in funding, and the portfolio value exceeds $30 billion. The Institute supports ongoing growth through post-program benefits like introductions to partners and investors.

The Founder Institute will launch its first Web3 cohort in its Core Program, starting on May 28, 2024, and ending on September 3, 2024. Polkadot will be a key program partner, providing support from its network of experts. The collaboration will help Polkadot gain exposure to new companies, projects, investors' networks, and raise awareness within the Founder Institute network.

Both the Founder Institute and Polkadot have responsibilities in this collaboration, such as providing mentors, presenting at program sessions, and creating special offers for enrolled founders. The MOU serves as a formal agreement between the parties, outlining their roles and responsibilities. Irina Karagyar, a Polkadot Head Ambassador, will sign the MOU on behalf of Polkadot, ensuring the agreement aligns with community decisions and the decentralized ethos of Polkadot.

In the summer of 2023, Mr. [Laurent Koehler,](https://www.linkedin.com/in/lkoehler81/) the Co-Director of the Founder Institute in Hong Kong, discussed his plans to launch a Web3 vertical in 2024 with me. His goal was to enhance business offerings for investors and applicants. As a growth Web3 Advisor at my company BQ9 and an active member of the Polkadot community, I found his vision particularly compelling. This prompted me to explore the unique opportunities it could present for the entire Polkadot ecosystem. Consequently, we began holding regular meetings where I contributed insights to help shape the program and evaluate the benefits of integrating with the Polkadot ecosystem. On March 15, 2024, Mr. Koehler and I formalized our collaboration, leading the Founder Institute to issue a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for Polkadot to onboard mentors and develop joint co-marketing initiatives.

\*\*Timing: \*\*We are living in crucial times for our industry towards mass adoption, and our initiatives are designed to help new startup founders learn about Polkadot's technology and its ecosystem, encouraging them to develop their projects within it. Given the nature of the Founder Institute, this collaboration is strategic and will enable the Polkadot ecosystem to gain essential exposure to new companies and projects, investors' networks, and to establish a presence and raise awareness within the Founder Institute network.

\*\*Relevance: \*\*The Founder Institute is recognized as the world's largest pre-seed startup accelerator. Founded in 2009 by Adeo Ressi and Jonathan Greechan, it was initially designed to provide early-stage startups with the structured process, feedback, and support network needed to succeed, which many entrepreneurs lacked at the time. This initiative started in Silicon Valley but quickly expanded globally due to high demand, now operating in over 200 cities and localized in nine languages​. To date, the Founder Institute's alumni have raised over $1.75 billion in funding, and the estimated portfolio value of these companies exceeds $30 billion. Beyond initial startup acceleration, the Founder Institute also supports ongoing growth through post-program benefits like introductions to potential partners and investors. They maintain a robust network of over 35,000 mentors and advisors to assist in various aspects of business development​.​ ([The Founder Institute](https://fi.co/))​.

**First-Mover Advantage:** The Founder Institute is set to launch its very first Web3 cohort within its Core Program, signifying a landmark expansion into the field of Web3. This inaugural cohort, which begins on May 28, 2024, and concludes on September 3, 2024, represents a significant milestone in the Institute’s history. It will be hosted by the Hong Kong Chapter. This new track will delve key verticals of the Web3 domain and will feature guidance from esteemed mentors within the Web3.0. Polkadot will be a key program partner in the Founder Institute's historic first Web3 cohort, bringing support from its network of distinguished experts from the Polkadot Ecosystem. To inaugurate this chapter with them gives the first-mover advantage to our ecosystem.

\*\*Founder Institute Responsibilities. \*\*Founder Institute shall undertake the following activities:

-   Provide online and onsite branding for Partner on the website for the FII Program
-   Introduce all enrolled founders in the Program to Partner Provide up to two (2) mentor slots for Partner as a mentor in the Program
-   Allow Partner to present at any desired session to all enrolled founders during the Program Email
-   Partner special offer to all enrolled founders in the Program (optional)

**Polkadot, Responsibilities**. Polkadot shall undertake the following activities:

-   Recommend a mentor(s) from the ecosystem
-   Present at the required program session(s) during the FII Program
-   Provide any marketing collateral necessary and required by FII to use as branding on the website(s) for the FII Program
-   Create a special offer for all enrolled founders in the Program (optional)

As previously mentioned, representatives from the Polkadot ecosystem will participate in the inaugural Web3 cohort from **May 28, 2024, to September 3, 2024**. However, our collaboration does not end there, since we will continue to recruit additional mentors for subsequent cohorts. Our goal is to understand the types of support founders seek from the Polkadot ecosystem and the innovative solutions they plan to introduce. We will use the insights gained from the first cohort to refine and enhance our engagement with the Founder Institute going forward.

**_Using this post on OpenGov as an MOU between Founder Institute & Polkadot._**

[MOU between Polkadot Ecosystem & Founder Institute](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GI5UTYxZjD8JhqYcVhETZCPbd5sKNsaQ/view?usp=drive_link)

An MOU often serves as a formal agreement between parties, outlining their roles and responsibilities. However, since Polkadot is a decentralized software and needs to be supported by its community this MOU will be considered a liabilities exempt Pilot Project between the parties.. Consequently, Facilitators and Focal Points will perform to support the parties and will act free of liabilities as well. This method will ensure transparency and accessibility to all stakeholders within the community. [Irina Karagyar](https://www.linkedin.com/in/irina-karagyaur/), as a Polkadot Head Ambassador, as a representative, will sign the MOU posted on OpenGov only symbolically on behalf of Polkadot. This ensures that the agreement aligns with community decisions and the decentralized ethos of Polkadot. By following these steps, the MOU becomes a roadmap document, formalizing the agreement between Polkadot (represented by the Ambassador) and the Founder Institute.

![](https://example.com/your-image.png)![](https://i.ibb.co/55MzcFk/FI-Polkadot-X-post.png)

[https://fi.co/insight/the-founder-institute-launches-its-first-hong-kong-web3-accelerator-in-collaboration-with-polkadot](https://fi.co/insight/the-founder-institute-launches-its-first-hong-kong-web3-accelerator-in-collaboration-with-polkadot)

An overview of the Founder Institute: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBHc\_3NgUo4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBHc_3NgUo4)

MOU:

![](https://i.ibb.co/pRTxR7K/MOU-Polkadot-Signed-FI-BQ9-1-images-0.jpg)

![](https://i.ibb.co/Bz3x3Lc/MOU-Polkadot-Signed-FI-BQ9-1-images-1.jpg)

![](https://i.ibb.co/ckDWbHJ/MOU-Polkadot-Signed-FI-BQ9-1-images-2.jpg)

For any further questions and collaboration opportunities, please do not hesitate to contact Irina Karagyuar, Co-Founder & CEO BQ9, Ecosystem Growth Agency,  irina@bq9.io

WHO: Polkadot and the Founder Institute

WHAT: Polkadot will onboard mentors and develop joint co-marketing initiatives with the Founder Institute to enhance business offerings for investors and applicants. Polkadot will recommend a mentor(s) from the ecosystem, present at the required program session(s), and provide any marketing collateral necessary. The Founder Institute will provide online and onsite branding for Polkadot, introduce all enrolled founders to Polkadot, and allow Polkadot to present at any desired session.

PRICE/TIMEFRAME/RESOURCES: The collaboration will take place from May 28, 2024, to September 3, 2024, during the Founder Institute's first Web3 cohort. The collaboration is strategic and will enable the Polkadot ecosystem to gain essential exposure to new companies and projects, investors' networks, and to establish a presence and raise awareness within the Founder Institute network. The MOU will be considered a liabilities exempt Pilot Project between the parties.

Pilot MOU Proposal for a Collaboration between the Polkadot Ecosystem and the Founder Institute:

The discussion is about whether to abolish DV (Dual Voting) in the context of on-chain governance for DOT holders. The main argument is that on-chain governance should focus on minimizing selling pressure rather than achieving fairness or equality. The majority of DOT holders should have more influence in decision-making because they are more likely to hold rather than sell their tokens. Abolishing DV could help achieve this by giving more power to the majority of DOT holders. This referendum aims to gather opinions from real DOT holders and understand their preferences, excluding DV to get a clearer picture of their intentions. The debate is between holders and non-holders, and capitalism versus socialism. The goal is to hear the opinions of real DOT holders to make better decisions for the ecosystem.

Should we abolish DV? I understand that technically this may not be feasible (unless the brilliant minds within the fellowship can find a way to implement it) but even if it is not technically possible I think this could still act as a survey for the real DOT holders to express their opinion and that maybe W3F will listen It is my opinion that the real ultimate purpose of on chain governance is to minimize selling pressure, and not to achieve some sort of abstract socialist idea of fairness or equality Every time there is a contentious decision it is always better that the majority of the real DOT holders have their way compared to the minority because in the worst case scenario it's going to be the minority selling and not the majority so it is always the best interest of the ecosystem that the majority of the real DOT holders that have the power to sell get their way The only purpose of governance is to minimize selling pressure and nothing else in my opinion Based on that assumption even in case it is not possible to technically prevent DV (as technically those are DOT belonging to W3F so this is not a matter of referendum) this can serve as a survey to indicate to W3F what is the real desire of the real DOT holders (the ones that can potentially sell because they really own DOT) This referendum done on this track allows to discover the intention of real DOT holders and it excludes DV so we can really understand what the real DOT holders want By the way this is not about whales versus shrimps but it's about holders versus non-holders and capitalism versus socialism Let's hear the opinion of the real DOT holders

The proposal suggests conducting a survey to gauge the opinion of real DOT holders on the possibility of abolishing DOT voting rights (DV) to minimize selling pressure. The aim is to understand the real desire of DOT holders, excluding DV, and communicate it to W3F. The proposal does not mention any specific price, timeframe, or resources.

Should we abolish DV?

- The proposal defines Polkadot 2.0 around the concept of Coretime.
- Polkadot 2.0 will include three main features: Agile Coretime, Async Backing, and Elastic Scaling.
- Agile Coretime lets parachains get and use coretime more easily.
- Async Backing allows parachains to send blocks to the main Polkadot chain more flexibly.
- Elastic Scaling gives parachains the ability to use extra resources when needed. 
- If accepted, the first version with these features will be called Polkadot 2.0.
- The Technical Fellowship will decide on the details and timing of these features.

WHO: The stakeholders voting AYE on this proposal.

WHAT: Define Polkadot 2.0 with three epic features - Agile Coretime, Async Backing, and Elastic Scaling.

PRICE/TIMEFRAME/RESOURCES: Not specified.

Polkadot 2.0 Definition

TimedOut

VOTE NAY

The article discusses the creation of an "Express Lane" track in the decentralized voting system. This new track aims to allow important proposals to bypass the DV (Delegated Voting) system, preventing them from being affected by delegations. The main points are:

1. The current DV system has a loophole in the treasury track, which will be closed by delegating the treasurer track to DV.
2. However, this will shift the loophole to the root track, which has only one slot and could be overwhelmed by proposals.
3. The proposed Express Lane track would have only 3 slots and require a decision deposit of 25,000 DOT.
4. This would allow important proposals to avoid DV without using the root track.
5. The Express Lane track would still maintain the power of DV, as the treasury track's decision deposit is only 1,000 DOT and has many slots.

Creation of express lane track: In the next batch of DV treasurer track will also be delegated to DV so a loophole will be closed: https://medium.com/web3foundation/decentralized-voices-cohort-2-eab16de857e2 However DV will not receive delegation for root track so the loophole is going to move to root track The problem is that root track only has one slot and so if it becomes a popular loophole it will spam root track and prevent other more important root proposals My suggestion is to create a track that is going to be called Express Lane, the goal of this track is to allow specific important proposals to be immune from DV (or delegations in general as it is easier for implementation) so that if one wants to avoid DV they do not have to use root track This is still an improvement for DV compared to the loophole of treasury track because the decision deposit for treasury track is only 1,000 DOT and it has many slots The idea of express lane is that it can only be used for important things, it should have only 3 slots and the decision deposit should be 25,000 DOT so it does not reduce the power of DV much but still allows for really important proposals to allow only the real DOT holders to vote without pushing them to use root track for this purpose

WHO: Proposal author
WHAT: Creation of an "Express Lane" track to allow important proposals to be immune from DV (or delegations in general) and prevent spamming of root track
PRICE/TIMEFRAME/RESOURCES: Decision deposit of 25,000 DOT, 3 slots, and no reduction in power of DV. No specific mention of price or timeframe.

Express Lane

The article discusses the impact of extended confirmation periods on referendums and proposes changes to the voting curves. The main issue is that a 7-day confirmation period allows for "no sniping," where people can vote against a referendum just before the end of the period, potentially aborting it without giving others a chance to vote in favor. The original 24-hour confirmation period was less prone to this issue. The author suggests adjusting the voting curves to account for the extended confirmation period, allowing referendums to pass with 50%+ support on day 21 instead of day 28, preventing no sniping during the confirmation period. The same adjustment is proposed for medium spender referendums, with the support level required on day 24 being zero and the threshold at 50%+, overlapping the last 4 days of the 28-day period with the 4-day confirmation period.

Changing the curves of the referendums that were affected by extended confirmation periods: Since the confirmation period was extended to 7 days it can be used as an opportunity for people to snipe vote no against a referendum during confirmation and basically abort it without giving it time for other people to vote in favor. This problem was less apparent when the confirmation period was 24 hours because the window of opportunity for sniping a no was much shorter. The reason confirmation period should exist is simply to avoid people waiting the last day of the referendum to vote yes to basically snipe a yes since 24 hours is a short time and some people may not notice and not vote against in time. The problem is that 7 days confirmation while being a useful protection against yes sniping becomes an opportunity for no sniping. It also slows down the process of the referendum even more than it was before. I think the right procedure should be to adjust the curves to account for the new extended confirmation. So instead of being able to pass with just 50%+ and any amount of support on day 28th this should happen on day 21 so that it can enter into confirmation on day 21 in the worst case scenario and then the 7 days of confirmation cannot be used for sniping because even if it is aborted the timer is still running until day 28 allowing people to then vote yes instead of aborting permanently The same should be done for medium spender where the confirmation now stands at 4 days so on day 24 of the curve the level of support required should be zero and the threshold should be just about 50%+ so that the last 4 days of confirmation overlap with the last 4 days of the 28 days period

Proposal: Adjust the curves of referendums affected by extended confirmation periods. Pass with 50%+ and any support on day 21 instead of day 28 to avoid sniping. Adjust medium spender threshold to 50%+ on day 24. Resources required: not specified.

Changing the curves of the referendums that were affected by extended confirmation periods

**Summary:**

- Users can nominate projects with their DOT tokens.
- Nominated projects receive funding from a constant stream of DOT taken from inflation.
- Funding is distributed based on the proportion of DOT used to nominate each project.
- Full details are available in a Google Docs document or an IPFS-saved PDF.
- There is a Telegram discussion group for this proposal: @parachainstaking.

**WHO:** Parachainstaking

**WHAT:** Allow users to nominate whitelisted projects with DOT, funded by a constant stream of DOT taken from inflation and distributed to projects based on the proportion of DOT that has nominated them.

**PRICE/TIMEFRAME/RESOURCES:** Not specified.

Implement Optimistic Project Funding

Inflation is too high, which stops new people from joining. A solution is to have a fixed supply and use a certain percentage of what's left as inflation. The total maximum supply could be 2.1 billion, which is related to Bitcoin. If we have 1.4 billion tokens now, that means we have 700 million left to use as rewards. A good number for inflation could be 10% of what's left. So, in the first year, the staking rewards distributed will be 70 million (10% of what's left). In the next year, only 63 million will be distributed because only 630 million will be left. This way, we never run out of tokens, and the amount distributed always gets less. This might make Polkadot more appealing to people.

The inflation is currently excessive and this turns off a lot of potential new entrants A good solution could be to have a fixed supply and then use as inflation a certain percentage of whatever is left I suggest using as total maximum supply 2.1 billions because it's a funny number and it's related to Bitcoin Let's assume at the moment we have 1.4 billion tokens, that means that we have 700 million left to use as rewards I think a good number for inflation could be 10% of whatever is left, so on the first year the staking rewards distributed will be 70 millions (10% of what is left) and then on the next year because only 630 millions will be left only 63 million will be distributed, etc. So we never run out of tokens because the amount distributed always get less and less but we have an absolute total cap and this probably make polkadot more appealing for a lot of people Details: https://x.com/giottodf/status/1783009866631811341

WHO: Proposal author

WHAT: Proposing a fixed supply and using a certain percentage of leftover tokens as inflation for staking rewards in Polkadot

PRICE/TIMEFRAME/RESOURCES: Not specified

Reducing inflation - VOTE NAY

- **Current Spending Periods**: Currently set at 24 days, these periods cause delays in funding.
- **Referendum Process**: It takes up to 28 days for a referendum to pass.
- **Confirmation Time**: An additional 7 days are needed for confirmation.
- **Cumulative Delay**: If confirmation ends on the first day of a new spending period, another 24 days are required, totaling up to 2 months.
- **Arbitrary Duration**: The 24-day period is considered arbitrary and problematic.
- **Proposal for Change**: Suggest reducing the spending period to the shortest possible time, ideally one day or one week if technically feasible.
- **Purpose of Change**: The shorter the period, the less uncertainty and quicker the funding process.

Proposal: **Reduce spending period to shortest possible time, ideally 1 day, or max 1 week, to avoid 2-month wait for funds.** Current 24-day period causes unnecessary uncertainty. Timeframe/resources not specified.

Reducing duration of spending periods

- The Polkadot EVM Collective is a group that works on everything related to EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) on Polkadot.
- It has four main goals: standardizing EVM changes, making development transparent, creating a roadmap, and providing expert advice.
- Members are ranked as Junior or Senior, and their roles define their responsibilities, like maintaining projects or editing documents.
- The collective uses a flat ranking system, meaning ranks only affect voting power, not other benefits.
- Members must stay active by participating in regular checks, or they lose voting rights and roles.
- The collective plans to have its own salary and treasury system, but funding will be decided by Polkadot referendums.
- Small collectives are preferred over one big group because they are faster, clearer, and easier to manage.

WHO: Polkadot EVM Collective
WHAT: On-chain technical collective for EVM standardization, development and maintenance, creating an inclusive roadmap, and providing expert opinions
PRICE/TIMEFRAME/RESOURCES: Salary and sub-treasury system for future use with values set to 0, any increase or funding only done through Polkadot referendums. Inactivity check utilized to ensure active members, with ranks and roles defining voting power and responsibilities. Seeding members subject to final vote of a root referendum. Small collectives deemed more effective for carrying out tasks. Flat ranking system with two ranks and separate concept of roles to define responsibilities.

Approve the Polkadot EVM Collective

Delegations are a good idea for some decisions, but not for very important ones. Some tracks, like Root, Wish for Change, and Treasurer, are too important to trust others with. This is because they can change the rules a lot or spend all the money. It's like how you can trust someone to sign a paper for you, but not for big life events like marriage or divorce. We should be careful with who we trust for these important decisions to keep the system safe. This idea is not just for one group, but for all important choices.

I propose not to allow any delegations on the following tracks which should be considered of vital importance: Root track (could completely change the protocol) Wish for change track (could produce deep changes in the protocol) Treasurer track (unlimited spending without any cap, potentially burning the full treasury if the beneficiary address is a burn address) The idea behind delegation is good, it's the concept that for specific actions you do not want to vote yourself but you rather trust a third party. However for things of extreme importance it is risky to trust a third party because of the well-known agent problem Just like in your daily life you can issue a POA for a commercial contract but not for extremely important events like for example marriage / divorce / etc Certain events are so critical that it is important to know that there is no risk that the agent might have a different opinion than the owner This is not specifically targeted at DV (even if of course their role has to be considered) but it's more about the idea that for certain tracks it is perfectly reasonable to do delegations and for others it's not in order to protect the integrity of the system

Proposal: Do not allow delegations on vital tracks (root, wish for change, treasurer) to protect system integrity. Delegation is good but risky for extreme importance. No specific target. No price/timeframe/resources mentioned.

Restrict delegations on root and treasurer tracks

root

whitelisted_caller

staking_admin

treasurer

lease_admin

fellowship_admin

general_admin

auction_admin

referendum_canceller

referendum_killer

small_tipper

big_tipper

small_spender

medium_spender

big_spender

Referenda Wish For Change

Origin able to dispatch a whitelisted call.

Origin able to cancel slashes and manage minimum commission.

Origin for spending up to 10,000,000 DOT from the treasury as well as generally administering it.

Origin for managing the composition of the fellowship.

Origin able to spend around 250 DOT from the treasury at once.

Origin able to spend around 1,000 DOT from the treasury at once.

Origin able to spend around 10,000 DOT from the treasury at once.

Origin able to spend around 100,000 DOT from the treasury at once.

Origin able to spend up to 1,000,000 DOT from the treasury at once.

[2] Origin: WishForChange